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Introduction 
According to the mental model theory, causes and enablers 
differ in meaning, and therefore in their logical 
consequences (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). They are 
consistent with different possibilities. Recent psychological 
studies have argued to the contrary, and suggested that 
linguistic cues guide this distinction (Kuhnmünch & Beller, 
2005). The issue is important because neither British nor 
American law recognizes this distinction (e.g., Roberts & 
Zuckerman, 2004). Yet, in our view, it is central to human 
conceptions of causality. Hence, in two experiments, we 
examined our participants’ ability to distinguish between 
causes and enablers in scenarios describing the actions of 
two agents and a subsequent outcome, e.g.: ‘Mary threw a 
lighted cigarette into a bush. Just as the cigarette was going 
out, Laura deliberately threw petrol on it. The resulting fire 
burnt down her neighbor’s house.’ Here Mary enabled the 
fire to occur, whereas Laura caused the fire to occur.  
Experiments 
Method 
In Experiment 1 (N = 34), one group answered questions 
about causers and one group answered questions about 
enablers. In Experiment 2 (N = 20), each participant 
answered questions about causers for half of the vignettes 
and questions about enablers for the other half. We created 
six vignettes describing criminal events, and, as in the 
example above, one agent enabled the outcome to occur and 
one agent caused it to occur. Each vignette occurred in three 
versions depending on which referent occurred first. Each 
participant received two instances of each of the orders, 
which were systematically rotated in the experiments as a 
whole. The participants’ task was to rate on a five point-
scale the responsibility of an agent, the extent to which an 
agent was the causer and the extent to which an agent was 
an enabler, to assign the number of years to which the agent 
should go to prison, and to assess the monetary damages 
that the agent should pay. These ratings occurred in 
different random orders from one trial to another.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 presents the mean ratings in the two experiments. 
The participants had no difficulty in distinguishing between 
causers and enablers. In comparison to enablers, causers 
were rated as more responsible, more a cause than an 
enabler of the outcome, liable to go to prison longer, and 
liable to pay greater damages. All these differences were 
reliable (using Mann Whitney tests in Experiment 1, U 
varied from 6 to 32, p < .001; and using Wilcoxon tests for 
Experiment 2, z varied from 3.6 to 3.9, p < .001). The order 
of mention of the agents had no reliable effect on the 
ratings. 
 
 Table 1: Mean ratings for causers and enablers in the experiments  
Rating                          Experiment 1    Experiment 2 
Cause 4.1 4.3 Responsibility 
1=not; 5=fully Enabler 2.5 2.1 
Cause 3.8 4.2 Enable/Cause 
1=enable;5=cause  Enabler 1.9 1.7 
Cause 14.7 11.9 Prison 
0 – 30 years Enabler 3.9 2.0 
Cause 64.6 62.9 Damages  
£0–£100,000 Enabler 30.9 16.7 
 
In sum, individuals are able to distinguish between those 
who cause events, and those who enable them to occur. 
Furthermore, they judge causers to be more responsible, 
liable for longer prison sentences, and liable to pay larger 
damages, than enablers.  
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